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THE ORIGINS OF THE

• •

COMMISION
Between September 1, 1929, and July
1, 1932, the value of all stock listed on
the New York Stock Exchange shrank
from a total of nearly $90 billion to just
under $16 billion - a loss of 83 percent.
In a comparable period, bonds listed on
the New York Stock Exchange declined
from a value of $49 billion to $31 billion.
'The annals of finance," the Senate
Banking Committee would write,
"present no counterpart to this enormous
decline in security prices." Nor did these
figures, staggering as they were, fully
gauge the extent of the 1929.-1932 stock
market crash. During the post-World
War I decade, approximately $50 billion
of new securities were sold in the United
States. Approximately half or $25 billion
would prove near or totally valueless.
Leading "blue chip" securities, including
General Electric, Sears, Roebuck, and
U.S. Steel common stock, would lose
over 90 percent of their value between
selected dates in 1929 and 1932.
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On July 7,
the Securities and Exchange
Commission was
60 years old.
The SEC was born
in crisis.

The SEC itself was created at the
conclusion of the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee's 1932-1934
investigation of Stock Exchange Practices,
usually called the Pecora Hearings, in
recognition of the decisive role played by
the committee's counsel, Ferdinand
Pecora.

ABUSES UNVEILED
Among other revelations, the Pecora
hearings showed that stock pools,
including several allied with senior
corporate executives, regularly employed
publicists to plant news stories and tips
with newspaper and radio journalists
during pool operations. Such revelations
were shocking both because of the
likelihood that false and misleading
information often was disseminated and
because one publicist was found to have
made cash payments to reporters work-

ing for the New York Times, the Wall
Street journal , and several other leading
newspapers.
The hearings documented that
shareholders were requested to sign
proxies vesting incumbent management
with power to cast their votes without
disclosure of management interests in the
transactions on which a vote was to be
taken.
Albert Wiggin, chairman of the board
of the Chase National Bank, it was
revealed, organized three corporations to
trade stock in the Chase National. During
the 1927 to 1932 period, these three
corporations earned profits of
$10,425,657, including over $4 million
as a result of fall 1929 short sales in the
Chase National Bank when Wiggin
concluded the bank's stock price was
"ridiculously high."
The most influential testimony of the
hearings concerned J.P. Morgan &
Company, which long had been regarded
as the leading American investment bank
and as the exemplar of conservative
underwriting practices. Yet, even the
House of Morgan was found to have
employed get-rich-quick tactics during
the late 1920s bull market.
In January 1929 Morgan & Company
and Bonbright & Company organized the
United Corporation, then one of the
nation's largest public utility holding
companies. Each firm traded shares in
other public utility firms and approximately $10 million in cash in return for
United Corporation's initial preferred and
common shares. In addition, the Morgan
and Bonbright firms received a total of
3,994,757 perpetual option warrants.
Each option warrant entitled the holder
at any time to purchase one share of
common stock at $27.50 a share, which
compares rather favorably to the high of
$73 that the common stock reached
during the summer of 1929.
The Morgan and Bonbright firms
distributed United Corporation shares to
the public by initially privately selling
them to a "preferred list," largely of
business and political figures, who, in
tum, created a market in United Corporation securities by reselling to the

public. At no point was a prospectus or
offering circular distributed. The initial
public shareholders knew some of the
securities in the United Corporation's
portfolio but did not know the extent of
United's holdings. The initial public
shareholders had never seen United
Corporation's balance sheet. They did not
know that the United Corporation's
certificate of incorporation granted its
directors "the power at any time .. .
without any action by the stockholders of
this corporation . . . to grant [additional]
rights or options . . . for any consideration . .. ." In fact , the initial public
shareholders were inspired to purchase
United Corporation shares largely on the
basis of their faith inj.P. Morgan &
Company. They lacked adequate data to
rationally evaluate the value of United
Corporation's shares.

FIXING THE
COMMON PROBLEMS
Much of this and similar evidence of
management or investment bank concealment or misrepresentation of material
investment information obviously was
episodic in nature. One reason that it was
so widely accepted as demonstrating the
need for new federal legislation was that
independent private studies and informed persons in the investment
community corroborated that the Pecora
Hearings' illustrations were typical of
common problems in the financial
community before 1934. On the basis of
1927 financial reports, for example,
Laurence Sloan, vice-president of Standard Statistics Company, found it
possible to compare the gross incomes
and net profits of only 4 3 percent of 545
leading industrial firms. Gross incomes,
Sloan found , were not reported by the
rest of these firms . For only 219 of the
545 firms was it possible to obtain data
revealing the sums that were charged to
depreciation and depletion in the years
1926 and 1927.
In 1935, the Twentieth Century
Fund's much-cited study, The Security
Markets, reached virtually the same
conclusion. The Fund was critical of the
sales tactics employed by investment
banks in preparing prospectuses, stating,
"The chief aim of the sponsors was to
induce customers to buy, rather than to

inform them . . . [t]he guiding principles
and the devices were those which had
been successfully employed in the field of
advertising and salesmanship." 1
Against this backdrop, the New Deal
witnessed the enactment of the six basic
federal securities laws:
• The Securities Act of 1933, is concerned primarily with the initial
distribution of securities to the public.
Initially this act was enforced by the
Federal Trade Commission.
• The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
addresses postdistribution trading
through a combination of periodic
mandatory disclosure, antifraud
remedies, regulation of broker-dealers
and securities markets, and control of
securities credit. The act, long the
most important of the federal securities laws, also created the SEC. Later,
the 1934 act was amended to add
regulation of tender offers, municipal
securities, government securities
dealers, securities clearance and
settlement, and to substantially
broaden its securities market regulatory provisions.
• The Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 dominated the early
history of the SEC. Under this act, the
most comprehensive reorganization of
an industry in United States history
occurred. The act has long since spent
its force .
• The Trust Indenture Act of 1939
supplements the 1933 act when a
distribution consists of certain debt
securities.
• The Investment Company Act of 1940
provides pervasive regulation of
investment companies (such as
mutual funds) .
• The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
requires registration with the SEC of
persons engaged for compensation in
the business of rendering advice or
issuing analyses concerning services.
Later a seventh law, the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970, was
adopted to provide the equivalent to
FDIC depository insurance for securities
customers.
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THREE REASONS
FOR SUCCESS
The intriguing historical question is
why these acts have endured as well as
they have. In my opinion, there are three
general explanations.
First, the SEC throughout its history
has been the beneficiary of an unusually
talented staff. In large measure, this was
a tribute to Felix Frankfurter, who
recruited the drafters of the 1933 and
I934 acts, and the agency's first three
chairmen Qoseph Kennedy, James
Landis, and William 0. Douglas), who
within a period of seven years hired,
trained, and organized more than 1,700
employees. While the quality of commissioners throughout the agency's history
has varied greatly, the quality of the
senior staff, in particular, has remained
high. The staff has given the agency its
institutional memory, its panache, and if
I may be so bold as to offer a compliment
to a recently much-criticized profession,
its lawyerly respect for facts.
Second, the SEC has shown unusual
prowess in exploiting the flexibility of the
administrative process. Its great achievement during the New Deal period was to
move beyond laws formed in crisis to the
systematic study of the relevant industries. This was done initially through
Congressional studies such as the Pecora
hearings, which produced a record of
more than 12,000 pages. Soon the SEC
itself hired William 0. Douglas to
conduct what became an eight- volume
study of Protective Committees which
laid the groundwork for the Chandler
Bankruptcy Revision Act of 1938 and the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939. Later SEC
Commissioner Robert Healy presided
over a 5 ,100 page study oqnvestment
companies, which resulted in 1940 in the
enactment of the Investment Company
and Investment Advisers acts. The most
outstanding post-World War II illustration of this genre was the 1961-1964
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Special Study of Securities Markets, led
by Milton Cohen, who worked closely
with SEC Chairman William Cary, and
provided a detailed and informed basis
for securities market regulation for a
generation.
Another aspect of the SEC's ingenious
use of the administrative process was its
early determination to use nonadversarial
approaches to help businesses comply
with the securities laws. Even before the
SEC was created in 1934, FTC Commissioner James Landis popularized the idea
of forwarding to issuers a "deficiency
letter" when a registration statement was
insufficient rather than seeking a stop
order. Similarly, early in the agency's
history the opportunity to write and
request staff no-action or interpretative
letters was originated.
In addition, the agency's use of the
administrative process has typically
(but not invariably) been thoughtful in
recognizing that an industry problem
could be solved by a vast panoply of
techniques ranging from a legislative
proposal, a new rule, an enforcement
action, an interpretative release, a study,
or an industry conference. The SEC,
more often than not, has erred on the
side of caution, in encouraging selfregulatory organizations such as the New
York Stock Exchange, the National
Association of Securities Dealers, or the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to
take the lead oar in addressing emerging
problems.
Third, the most important reason that
the SEC has endured, I submit, is that
ultimately it is based on a regulatory
theory that works. At its core, the
primary policy of the federal securities
laws involves the remediation of information asymmetries. This is most obviously
the case with respect to the mandatory
disclosure system which compels issuers
and registrants to provide detailed
generally firm-specific information when
selling new securities and in periodic
disclosure documents. It is equally the
basis of the Commission's regulation of
broker-dealers and investment advisers,
which through a variety of techniques including reporting, record-keeping,
minimum net capital, and inspection attempts to deter broker-dealers from

charging excessive commissions or
markups in individual securities transactions and to protect customers from
entrusting their securities or funds to
broker-dealers on the verge of insolvency.
The remediation of information
asymmetries has provided a third and
superior alternative to laissez-faire
capitalism and regulation of fundamental
economic conditions such as entry or
merger. The theory attempts to provide
sufficient information so that a largely
market-driven segment of the economy
can work. To be sure, it is not perfect.
It requires an effective enforcement
program and constant, and sometimes
subtle, adjustments as the context of
regulation charges. But it has proven to
be a method of unparalleled resiliency in
addressing new economic conditions
throughout a 60-year history.
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